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Legitimacy-seeking mechanisms in product innovation: a qualitative 
study1 
Raluca Bunduchi 
University of Edinburgh Business School, 29 Buccleuch Place, Edinburgh, EH8 9JS, tel: 0044 (0)131 651 
5544, email: raluca.bunduchi@ed.ac.uk  
Abstract 
Product innovation research adopts a rational choice perspective to examine resource 
allocation decisions for product innovation. This research emphasises strategic alignment 
between the innovation and the organisation as the key factor shaping these decisions. In 
contrast, organisational research suggests that to access resources, product innovations 
have to be perceived as legitimate by corporate sponsors. Legitimacy is rooted in 
alignment with the prevalent corporate norms, beliefs, and cultural model. Adopting an 
institutional perspective and relying on an in-depth case study of three product 
innovations, this study explores legitimacy-seeking behaviour in product innovation. The 
findings indicate that the rational perspective emphasised in most product innovation 
research is complemented by efforts to seek both moral and cognitive legitimacy to 
resource product innovation. The study clarifies the critical role that the organisational 
context plays in triggering legitimacy-seeking behaviour. The analysis unpacks 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour, revealing patterns of legitimating mechanisms (lobbying, 
relationship building, and gathering feedback) that are deployed as part of legitimacy 
strategies (conforming, selecting and manipulating) to achieve a range of legitimacy 
outcomes (pragmatic, moral and cognitive). The analysis reveals the existence of a 
hierarchy of legitimacy outcomes as actors prioritise one type of legitimacy versus 
                                                 
1 This is the author manuscript version of the paper accepted for publication in Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, 2016. 
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another. The study also finds inter-dependencies between mechanisms and strategies to 
reinforce particular outcomes as legitimacy-seeking behaviour evolves over time. 
Practitioner points: 
 Gathering support for new product ideas depends on the product managers’ ability 
to legitimise the product idea through demonstrating either the utility of a product, 
and/or its alignment with the normative expectations and the prevalent cultural 
models within their organisation.  
 Legitimation can be achieved through deploying specific legitimacy seeking 
mechanisms, including lobbying, relationship building and seeking feedback, as 
part of one or more of the following strategies: conforming to organisational 
expectations, selecting supportive audiences and manipulating their perceptions. 
 Combining different mechanisms as part of varied strategies, and targeting 
multiple legitimacies is likely to be more efficient than focusing solely on 
conforming to demonstrate product utility as recommended by most existing best 
practice product innovation studies.  
 Legitimacy-seeking efforts involves trade-offs and interdependencies leading to 
different legitimacy outcomes, so that particular combinations of mechanisms and 
strategies can be used strategically to target specific legitimacy outcomes. 
Introduction 
How do innovators gain acceptance for their new product idea within established 
organisations? How do they engage with internal stakeholders to ensure that resources 
are allocated and support is lent to develop their new idea into a fully-fledged product? 
By and large, new product development (NPD) research takes a strategic rational choice 
perspective to examine resource allocation for product innovation (Klingebiel and 
Rammer, 2013) arguing that product innovations are desirable and appropriate if they fit 
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with an organisation’s strategy (Kahn et al., 2012; Kester, Hultink and Griffin, 2014). 
However, in practice decision-making during product innovation is a political process 
shaped by the distribution of power within a firm (Weissenberger-Eibl and Teufel, 2011), 
characterised by extensive negotiation among different corporate interest groups 
(Martinsuo, 2013), and whose outcome depends on the ability of a project manager to 
lobby effectively for support and resources (Rauniar et al., 2008). Thus in order to acquire 
resources to pursue their product idea, innovator actors often complement rational 
decision-making approaches based on strategic alignment with efforts to legitimize their 
product selection decisions (Gutierrez and Magnusson, 2014). Organisational research 
shows how organisational innovator actors seek to legitimize their idea internally (Drori 
and Honig, 2013) by emphasising cognitive and normative alignments with the 
organisation (Dougherty and Heller, 1994; Van Dijk et al., 2011), rather than relying on 
economic calculations of strategic fit. Acquiring internal legitimacy is critical, as 
legitimacy provides actors with access to corporate resources (Parsons, 1960), allowing 
them to progress their innovation idea through to development (Kannan-Narasimhan, 
2014).  
While organisational research has a long tradition of exploring legitimacy from an 
institutional perspective (Scott, 1987), interest in legitimacy as a means of obtaining 
access to resources has only recently emerged in other management areas such as 
entrepreneurship (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), product innovation in new ventures 
(Rao, Chandy and Prabhu, 2008), and marketing (Park et al., 2012). 
This article argues that, given the evidence that internal legitimacy plays a critical role 
during product innovation, one important avenue for research is to explore the 
institutional dynamics that underlie legitimacy-seeking behaviour in product innovation, 
beyond the strategic alignment emphasised by the dominant rational choice paradigm. To 
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explore legitimacy-seeking behaviour, this study focuses on one particular type of product 
innovation where the challenges of legitimacy are exacerbated: value-adding 
complementary product innovations in marginal units. Value-adding complementary 
products have huge potential to create competitive advantage for firms engaged in 
developing primary products (Sengupta, 1998). However, as organisations tend to focus 
on their core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990), they prioritise resource 
allocation for the development of primary products which match existing organisational 
competencies at the expense of complementary products. Moreover, marginal business 
units occupy low positions in the organisational power hierarchy, with limited “status” 
and little legitimacy (Battilana, 2011). Lacking legitimacy, such marginal units, and the 
innovations they initiate, are often starved of adequate support and resources, compelling 
innovator actors to engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviour. The research questions are: 
RQ1: What are the contextual factors that trigger innovator actors to seek legitimacy for 
their product innovations? 
RQ2: What forms of legitimacy do innovator actors seek for their product innovation? 
RQ3: What are the mechanisms through which legitimacy responses are enacted by 
innovator actors during product innovation? 
The research questions are addressed through an in-depth, longitudinal qualitative case 
study of three complementary product innovations in a large consumer technology 
company. The findings lead to the development of a framework that (i) clarifies the role 
of context in triggering legitimacy-seeking behaviour; (ii) provides a granular analysis of 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour by differentiating between types of legitimacy; and (iii) 
reveals the low-level legitimacy mechanisms that innovator actors deploy as part of their 
high-level legitimacy strategies.  
Theoretical framework 
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Institutional theory and legitimacy 
Institutional theory emerged as a response to economic and resource dependency theories 
that explain organisational action based on strategic, self-interest calculations (Scott, 
1987). In contrast to these economic approaches, institutional theory conceptualises 
organisational behaviour as the product of ideas, values and beliefs that originate in the 
institutional environment in which organisations are embedded (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). In order to survive, organisations follow what is socially perceived as legitimate 
in their environment, rather than making rational calculations based on economic 
efficiency and performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory thus places 
special emphasis on legitimacy processes through which organisations conform to what 
is seen as “desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” (Suchman, 1995; pg. 574). Legitimacy is 
important because it increases chances of survival (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) as 
stakeholders are more willing to commit resources to legitimate actors (Parsons, 1960). 
Most organisational research focuses on external legitimacy, which is granted to 
organisations by external stakeholders such as suppliers, customers or other interest 
groups (e.g. Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Less understood is internal legitimacy, which is 
granted to individual organisational actors or groups such as business units (Brown and 
Toyoki, 2013). This study focuses on internal legitimacy, defined as the collective 
acceptance by organisational members that a product innovation developed by an 
organisational actor is desirable, proper or appropriate (see Suchman, 1995).  
Research identifies different types of legitimacy and a variety of organisational actions to 
gain such legitimacy (Oliver, 1991; Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). This study draws from 
Suchman’s (1995) work, which differentiates between three types of organisational 
legitimacy depending on their underlying behavioural dynamics: pragmatic, based on 
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interest; moral, based on evaluation; and cognitive based on cognition. While pragmatic 
legitimacy follows the rational, strategic tradition, moral and cognitive legitimacy 
conform to the institutional perspective. 
Pragmatic legitimacy is based on “the self-interest calculations” of an organisation’s 
stakeholders (Suchman, 1995, pg, 578), requiring an assessment of the organisation’s 
expected value (exchange legitimacy); its degree of alignment with the stakeholders’ own 
goals and interests (influence legitimacy); or its good character, i.e. whether the 
organisation is honest, trustworthy, decent and wise (dispositional legitimacy). While 
pragmatic legitimacy assumes an organisation to be desirable based on its utility to the 
audience (Golart and Sillince, 2007), moral and cognitive legitimacies assess desirability 
based on the organisation’s alignment with the normative beliefs and cultural model 
embedded within the audience’s institutionalised value system. Moral legitimacy requires 
an assessment of organisational actions as being “the right thing to do” (Suchman, 1995, 
pg. 579) based on an evaluation of the organisation’s consequences and outputs 
(consequential legitimacy); its techniques and procedures (procedural legitimacy); its 
structural characteristics and the categories it belongs to (structural legitimacy); or its 
leaders and representatives (personal legitimacy). Cognitive legitimacy considers 
whether the organisation is valid based either on its inevitability as the organisation is 
“taken for granted” within a particular context so that alternatives are unthinkable (taken 
for granted legitimacy); or its comprehensibility as the organisation aligns with the 
prevalent cultural model thus being comprehensible to its audience (comprehensibility 
legitimacy) (Suchman, 1995). 
When organisations lack one or multiple types of legitimacy, they respond to legitimacy 
crises by choosing between three legitimacy strategies: conforming, selection and 
manipulation (Suchman, 1995). Conforming is the most common strategy, and involves 
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adapting organisational structures and procedures to fit the institutional regime, thus 
signalling allegiance to the existing cultural order (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In 
fragmented contexts, organisations can avoid changing their behaviours by selecting an 
environment that will give them legitimacy. Manipulation might be pursued by innovators 
whose actions depart significantly from existing norms and who may develop new 
explanations of social reality to mould the environment to fit their needs (Suchman, 
1995). 
Product innovation and legitimacy 
Gaining legitimacy for a new product idea early in development is critical to allow 
innovator actors to acquire resources to develop and concretize their emergent idea before 
it is accepted into the formal corporate NPD process (Floren and Frishammar, 2012). 
However, existing NPD research prescribes that idea generation (Amabile, 1998), new 
product opportunities (Floren and Frishammar, 2012), the criteria for resource allocation 
(Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Kester, Hultnik and Griffin, 2014), and more 
generally decisions in product innovation teams (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2012) should be 
aligned with a firm’s strategy. The assumption underlying this prescription is that the 
behaviour of innovator actors is driven by economic efficiency and performance 
calculations. A product innovation idea is therefore “desirable, proper and appropriate” 
(Suchman, 1995) only if it is perceived by its corporate sponsors to align with their 
strategic interests (Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Kester, Hultnik and Griffin, 
2014) by contributing to organisational performance (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995) (e.g. 
pragmatic legitimacy). 
However, organisational research suggests that decision making for product innovation 
often overlooks rational calculations of economic efficiency. For example, Tripsas and 
Gavetti (2000) discuss the role of cognition in explaining why Polaroid abandoned the 
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digital camera project but continued with Helios, a medical digital imaging product, 
which conformed to the top management’s preferred business model. Ray and Ray’s 
(2011) analysis of Nano, touted as the world’s cheapest car, reveals that Tata partially 
justified the innovation by emphasising normative alignment with the “right things to 
do”. Nano was portrayed as saving lives by providing a safer means of transport, meaning 
that Tata “ha[d] done something for the mass of young Indians” (Ray and Ray, 2011, pg. 
221). This strand of organisational research on product innovation emphasises legitimacy 
based on cognitive and normative alignments in the context of product innovation. For 
example, research finds that product innovation often fails because of misalignments 
between the cognitive templates of the corporate actors (Dougherty, 1992), and that 
innovator actors seek to legitimise their decisions by bypassing the accepted rational 
decision making approaches (Gutierrez and Magnusson, 2014) through employing a 
range of high-level legitimacy strategies (Dougherty and Heller, 1994; Van Dijk et al, 
2011; Vermeulen, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2007). This research has been 
instrumental in demonstrating the limitations of the rational choice perspective to explain 
product innovation, while advancing our understanding of legitimacy-seeking strategies 
employed during product innovation.  This understanding is, however, not yet complete.  
First, the literature implicitly adheres to the institutional research assumption that 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour is triggered by legitimacy crises as organisational actors 
lack one or multiple forms of legitimacy (e.g. Suchman, 1995). Institutional studies find 
that established organisations typically view novel, unproven innovation ideas in general 
(Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014), and product innovation ideas in particular (Dougherty and 
Heller, 1994), as illegitimate as such innovations both represent a change from the 
established organisational norms and behaviours and are characterised by high levels of 
uncertainty. As product innovation ideas lack legitimacy at the outset, innovation actors 
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in established organisations will always engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviour to seek 
resources (Takeishi, Aoshima and Karube, 2010), regardless of the wider organisational 
context in which this innovation happens. When the context is taken into account, the 
focus is on its role in shaping the likelihood of success of legitimacy strategies, rather 
than on the likelihood that legitimacy-seeking behaviour will happen at all (Van Dijk et 
al., 2011). Consequently, the first research question examines the role of context in 
triggering legitimacy-seeking behaviour in product innovator actors (RQ1). 
Second, existing research on legitimacy-seeking in product innovation evolved along two 
distinct strands: the rational choice perspective focusing on pragmatic legitimacy and 
emphasising strategic alignment as embodied in a number of “best practices” (e.g. Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1995; Cooper, Edgett and Kleinschmidt, 2004; Kahn et al., 2012), and 
the institutional research examining strategies to gain cognitive and moral legitimacy (e.g. 
Van Dijk et al., 2011). These strands remain separate, and there is little effort to examine 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour through considering all three types of legitimacy. Even 
within institutional research, there is a tendency to treat legitimacy-seeking behaviour as 
a monolithic concept, without delineating between the types of legitimacy targeted 
through different legitimacy strategies. The second research question thus explores the 
range of legitimacies pursued by product innovator actors (RQ2). 
Third, building upon the seminal work of Dougherty and Heller (1994), existing 
institutional research on product innovation has focused on the nature and success of 
legitimacy strategies. Similar to Suchman’s (1995) generic strategies, legitimacy 
strategies identified in the context of product innovation include (i) conforming to the 
usual practices within a firm by following existing processes, or by associating the 
innovation with a legitimate practice such as venture units; (ii) selecting supporting 
sponsors; and (iii) manipulating their perceptions through reframing new activities by 
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using legitimate metaphors such as pilot production (Dougherty and Heller, 1994; Van 
Dijk et al., 2011; Vermeuleun, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2007). A further strategy is 
identified as (iv) tolerance-seeking, where the innovators rely on the benign neglect of 
the corporate actors for whom the innovation is illegitimate (Van Dijk et al., 2011). 
Research found that the deployment of these strategies depended on the nature of the 
institutionalised organisational context. For example, a homogenous institutional 
environment encourages conformity, whereas heterogeneity favours selection (Van Dijk 
et al., 2011). What is not known, however, is how these strategies are operationalised at 
lower levels of analysis to achieve different legitimation outcomes. How do innovator 
actors signal conformity to existing norms, and what does manipulation entail in practice? 
How do the mechanisms through which actors enact their conformity to gain pragmatic 
legitimacy differ from those used to achieve moral legitimacy? The third research 
question therefore explores the mechanisms that underline the legitimacy-seeking 
strategies employed by innovator actors (RQ3). 
Finally, existing studies take a snapshot view of legitimacy-seeking behaviour, examining 
legitimation strategies that innovator actors pursue at one point in time for a particular 
product either within the same (Dougherty and Heller, 1994) or across different (Van Dijk 
et al., 2011) organisational contexts. There is, however, no sense of history, of the pre-
existing relationships between the innovator actor and his or her corporate audience. The 
relationship between innovator actors and their corporate audience evolves over time, 
shifting and changing from one product to another. These relationships are not 
constructed anew at the beginning of each NPD cycle, but are defined within the context 
in which both the actor and his or her audience are embedded. Therefore this study 
examines legitimacy-seeking behaviour and contextual triggers as they evolve over time 
during multiple NPD cycles. 
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Methodology 
To study the dynamics underlying legitimacy-seeking behaviour, the research design 
needed to elicit an in-depth understanding of a particular set of micro-level organisational 
activities: the interactions and behaviours of innovator actors occurring during the 
development of a specific product. The qualitative case study research method was chosen 
because of its suitability to investigate such micro-level organisational activities (Perks, 
Gruber and Edvardsson, 2012), and its ability to provide a deep understanding of actors’ 
behaviours during specific processes (Woodside and Wilson, 2003). Case study research 
also produces rich descriptions of the contextual setting (Yin, 2003) allowing the study 
to explore the role that context plays in instigating legitimacy-seeking behaviour over 
time. 
Research setting 
This study followed a longitudinal case study research design, exploring legitimacy-
seeking behaviour in three product innovations developed over seven years within a 
marginal business unit (Secondary Unit) of a large consumer technology company. 
Secondary Unit’s products (termed secondary products) include components, and 
supplies complementary products such as cables and connectors and value-adding 
complementary products such as speakers. The company’s main business (Primary Unit) 
targets a highly competitive segment of the consumer technology industry.  
Case selection followed the intensity criterion to provide information rich cases where 
the manifestation of the phenomenon was intense (see Miles and Huberman, 1994). As 
explained in the introduction, the nature of the product (value-added, complementary) 
and the nature of the innovator actor (marginal) exaggerated the need for legitimacy. At 
the outset of the study, the Secondary Unit suffered from a long term internal legitimacy 
crisis, thus further intensifying its need for legitimacy (Suchman, 1995). The three 
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secondary product innovations were chosen based on the senior management assessment 
of their success in improving the Secondary Unit’s legitimacy within the parent (see Table 
1). It was expected that success in gaining legitimacy would be associated with intensive 
manifestations of legitimacy-seeking behaviour, thereby providing richer information for 
these products (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The products are described in Table 1. 
Table 1: Complementary product innovations 
Product 
characteristics 
Secondary Product 1 
(SecPrd1) 
Secondary Product 2 
(SecPrd2) 
Secondary Product 3 
(SecPrd3) 
Development 
time 
Formal approval to 
begin: 2009 
 
Launch: 2010 
Formal approval to begin: 
2011 
 
Launch: 2012 
Formal approval to begin: 
2013 
 
Cancelled following 
company-wide re-
organisation during which 
the entire category of 
products was shifted to 
another business unit: 2014 
Type of 
innovation 
Existing technology 
embedded in new product 
for company 
Improvements in existing 
technology embedded in 
new product for the 
company & the industry 
Early radical concept in 
industry & new product for 
the company 
Nature of 
product 
offering 
One product under the 
company brand 
Three products, two co-
branded, one under 
company brand 
One product under 
company brand 
Link to 
primary 
product 
Some value added, but 
the product can function 
independently of primary 
product. 
 
No technology changes 
required in primary 
product 
Adds value to the primary 
product. 
 
 
Requires design & 
technology changes in 
primary product with cost 
implications 
Short term value added, 
long term disruption in 
primary product 
 
Required no direct 
technical change in 
primary product 
Product 
outcome 
(assessment of 
success on 
improving the 
legitimacy of 
the unit) 
First product to change 
the image of the products 
developed in the 
Secondary Unit within 
the company. The 
product was widely 
regarded as having 
beautiful design, 
although not being of 
strategic value to the 
primary product 
Product highly successful 
both internally and 
externally. Seen as 
bringing large value to the 
primary product, and as 
having an image that fits 
market expectations. 
 
Strong alignment during 
development between 
Primary and Secondary 
Units, and seen as 
demonstrating the benefits 
of close collaboration 
Widely regarded within the 
company as highly 
innovative and the type of 
product category that 
should be pursued (the 
product category was 
continued within a 
different unit) 
The selection of the three product innovations was also driven by the need for maximum 
variety across product characteristics, in particular the type of innovation, the nature of 
product offering, and the products’ relation to the primary products. Maximum variation 
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in selection ensured that the research could identify patterns across diverse variations in 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour. While all products were value-added complementary 
products, they all exemplified different types of innovation. Secondary product 1 
(SecPrd1) and 2 (SecPrd2) represented incremental innovations involving either 
improvements in existing (SecPrd1) or new (SecPrd2) technologies to the industry. 
Secondary Product 3 (SecPrd3) was a radical product concept in the industry. SecPrd1 
and SecPrd3 included one independent product, while SecPrd2 technology was 
incorporated in three products: a “basic” product providing core functionality, and two 
products co-developed and co-branded with external partners with added functionality. 
The products also exemplify different types of relationship between primary and 
secondary products. This relationship can be analysed from three perspectives: 
operational - linkages during development; strategic - contribution to value creation, and 
functional - interdependencies during use. Operationally, SecPrd1 and SecPrd3 required 
no technical changes to the primary product. SecPrd2 required the addition of a new 
technology with significant cost and design implications for the primary product. 
Functionally, SecPrd1 could be used with a variety of products outside primary product 
category, while SecPrd2 and SecPrd3 were tied to the primary product. Strategically, 
SecPrd1 had little effect on the sales of the primary product, SecPrd2 was a key 
differentiator to increase primary product sales and SecPrd3 had the potential to disrupt 
the primary market and become the main source of value for the company.  
Finally, the selection of the three innovations was also driven by the need to cover key 
stages in the evolution of the unit to reflect critical shifts in the contextual conditions 
triggering legitimacy-seeking behaviour (see Figure 1).  
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2007 201520112009 20132012 201420102008
Stage 1.1 
of data 
collection
Stage 1.2 
of data 
collection
Stage 2 of 
data 
collection
Stage 3 of 
data 
collection
work on 
SecondaryPrd1 
formally starts 
(unit level 
decision)
SecondaryPrd1 
is launched
work on 
SecondaryPrd2 
formally starts 
(unit level 
decision)
work on 
SecondaryPrd3 
informally starts
work on SecondaryPrd3 
is formally approved in 
the company Board 
(company level 
decision)
SecondaryPrd3 is 
cancelled following 
company wide re-
organisation
SecondaryPrd2 
is launched
SecondaryPrd1 
SecondaryPrd2 
SecondaryPrd3 
Unit: 250+ 
engineers, 
R&D focused
Unit: 200+ 
engineers, R&D 
focused
Unit: 30+ product 
management 
focused
Secondary unit split 
from Primary unit 
following a company 
wide re-organisation
Change in unit leadership 
(new Head from outside 
the organisation)
Change in unit leadership 
(former SecPrd2 business owner 
takes over as Head)
Unit reorganised 
around low and 
high value 
added 
secondary 
products
Company major 
re-organisation 
following external 
acquisition
Unit: 20+ 
product 
management 
focused
High end primary 
market small and 
focused on 
differentiation 
based on primary 
product features
High end primary market large and 
characterised by competition based 
on differentiation around an 
ecosystem of products including 
secondary and primary products
High end market 
disrupted by a new 
secondary product 
category that shift 
value creation to 
secondary 
products
New competitor enters 
primary market focusing 
on differentiation based on 
a range of secondary 
products & services
New competitor 
enter secondary 
market focusing on 
differentiation 
based on secondary 
product alone
MARKET 
UNIT
Data 
collection
Products
 
Figure 1: Study timeline 
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Over the seven years of this study, Secondary Unit evolved from being a relatively 
autonomous and large, R&D-intensive business unit with over 250 employees to being a 
small, product management-focused unit with fewer than 30 employees dependent on 
R&D resources from the parent. In parallel, the market for the primary products changed 
dramatically. In 2007, the high end of the primary product market was small, competition 
involved differentiation based on primary product attributes, and secondary products 
were seen as essential products fulfilling a functional  (e.g. chargers) rather than a value-
adding role. During the research, the high-end primary market grew dramatically, with 
competition involving an ecosystem of complementary products and services where 
secondary products were seen first as a key source of value added and, by the end of the 
study, as the main source for new value creation in the market. 
Research design: data collection and analysis 
The research design was organised in three stages over a seven-year period. Stage 1 was 
conducted in 2007-2008 and examined the approach to product innovation within the unit. 
Data collection involved sixteen interviews (ten in 2007 and six in 2008) with eleven 
senior managers and members of the product development team, a two-hour workshop 
with the unit management team (22 participants) in 2007, and the examination of 
extensive internal secondary documentation. Part of the data from this stage (2007) served 
originally to generate insights into best practice in NPD.  
An opportunity to explore legitimation strategies in product innovation emerged 
following the introduction in 2012 of SecPrd2. This was widely perceived to have altered 
the unit’s internal legitimacy. Stage 2 took place in early 2013 and involved ten interviews 
with senior staff involved in SecPrd2 development (two business owners who are 
responsible for an entire category of products, approve product development and appoint 
the product development teams, five senior managers in the unit and three senior members 
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of the product development team), two of whom had also been involved in SecPrd1 
development (SecPrd1 business owner and a senior manager). Although the focus of data 
collection was on SecPrd2, the interviews also covered the approach to SecPrd1 
development, which was widely considered to constitute a critical point in “paving the 
way” for the success of SecPrd2. Publicly available data such as company and media 
product reports were collected to triangulate the interview data. Stage 2 examined the 
approach to product development, the conditions that led to development, and the 
outcomes for the unit. 
In 2014, in Stage 3, a three-hour interview with the business owner of SecPrd3 was 
conducted. SecPrd3 business owner had also been involved in a senior R&D management 
role in the development of SecPrd1 and SedPrd2. Stage 3 data served to examine the 
development of SecPrd3, and to triangulate Stage 2 data on SecPrd1 and SecPrd2. 
The major downside of the informant sample is the reliance on three informants for the 
direct development of SecPrd1 and one for SecPrd3, while in the case of SecPrd2 ten 
respondents were interviewed. Reliance on one or a few informants questions the 
reliability of data on two counts (Woodside, 2016). First, such data are argued to reflect 
a limited perspective of the phenomenon, generated through the often flawed recollection 
of past events or behaviours. Second, such data are interpreted in isolation as there is 
often a lack of meaningful information about the context of these events and behaviours. 
The approach taken here addresses both these counts.  
First, although limited in number, SecPrd1 and SecPrd3 informants were all senior 
managers, including the products business owners, recollecting relatively recent events 
which, together with the R&D intensive nature of the industry, is found to increase the 
reliability of collected data (Homburg et al., 2012). Further, a reduction in unit size to 
about 30 R&D personnel meant that product development and legitimising activities for 
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SecPrd3 were much more concentrated in the business owner, rather than dispersed across 
a wider NPD team as it was the case during SecPrd2 development. Wherever possible the 
approach to data collection also involved triangulation of information from different 
informants across different stages, as well as triangulation between primary and 
secondary data such as market reports and media articles. For example SecPrd3 was 
briefly discussed by a senior manager during Stage 2, confirming the Stage 3 data on the 
significance of the product for the unit. Also, media reports on the SecPrd3 product 
category were used to triangulate the SecPrd3 business owner’s views on the nature of 
the product and its possible market impact. 
Second, the researcher had extensive knowledge of the context at the time SecPrd1 and 
SecPrd3 data were collected based on the research that was previously conducted during 
Stage 1 (for SecPrd1) and Stage 2 (for SecPrd3). The researcher was therefore able to 
relate the interview data to the context in which products were developed. Moreover, 
these interviews were in-depth conversations about actors’ behaviour during product 
development (e.g. three hours for SecPrd3) made in the context of a prolonged and 
ongoing research engagement with the unit (over seven years), and not context free 
elicitations of superficial answers to a predefined set of questions from one respondent.  
Data analysis progressed gradually through iterations between coding, writing narratives 
and revisiting the literature. An initial list of codes was developed based on the literature 
review, and was refined gradually during analysis. At Stage 1, the coding list reflected 
the original study’s goal of examining good practice in product innovation, and included 
categories such as organisational context and NPD approach. Data from Stages 2 and 3 
were initially coded using Van de Ven, Angle and Poole’s (2000) categories for exploring 
innovation processes: ideas, people, transactions, context, and outcomes. These initial 
descriptive codes (Miles and Huberman, 1994), corresponding to the first order categories 
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suggested by Gioia, Corley and Hamilton (2012), involved identifying initial concepts 
from the data and relied as faithfully as possible on the terminology used by informants. 
Following descriptive coding, write-ups were built to triangulate the data for all first order 
categories. The write-ups were gradually refined to identify second order categories, and 
to clarify the theoretical themes and concepts emerging from the descriptive coding. To 
ensure coding reliability, two reports based on the write-ups were shared with the 
organisation to ensure that the researcher’s interpretation of events reflected the 
understandings of the respondents (at Stages 1 and 2). Later during the analysis, as the 
final themes were clarified, the emerging narrative was discussed with a key respondent 
from the organisation involved in all three products, and with academic colleagues with 
innovation research expertise, to check the researcher’s approach to coding and 
interpretation. The final data structure is presented in Figure 2, with data supporting the 
coding included in Table 2 (in appendix).  
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 Changes in structure, cleaning product portfolio and re-positioning the unit
 Strategic re-alignment with the parent company
 Availability of R&D resources internally for product execution
 The operational & strategic relationship between primary & secondary products
 Changes in the market demand & competition
 Emergence of a new disruptive product category in the market
 Product advertising based on technical demos & presentations to describe the
product to key stakeholders and to develop a compelling story
 Regular communication with key teams / stakeholders
 Involving legitimate external partners to leverage their legitimacy
 Internal informal networking through the parent/primary organisation to gather
support and create critical mass
 Ah hoc internal testing with organisational members
 External feedback on product / concept from the market
2nd order concepts1st order concepts themes
Triggers of legitimacy 
seeking behaviour
Legitimacy 
mechanisms
Legitimacy strategies
Legitimacy patterns
Structural and strategic changes
Change in the degree of control 
over resources for innovation
Change in market context
Lobbying
Relational building
Seeking feedback
 Emphasise product value added while downplaying product green credentials
 Engage in external partnerships to create product image despite the prevalent
inhouse approach to product development
 Seek external feedback to support internal lobbying efforts
 Extensive networking at team level to precede lobbying at management level
Trade offs
Inter-dependencies
Conforming
Selection
Manipulation
 Demonstrate product fit with existing expectations, norms and interests
 Identify and selectively target receptive audiences to seek support for the product
 Change audiences’ perceptions, assessment and or assessment of the product
 Perceived value of product & unit for the primary product & unit (exchange value)
 Participation in strategic decision making within the parent company (influence)
 Image of the secondary product in the company & marketspace (consequential)
 Visibility of secondary product in the parent & the marketspace (consequential)
 Reputation / profile of unit within the parent company (structural)
 Model of organising NPD in the unit vis-à-vis the parent (comprehensibility)
 Separate unit’s identity vis-à-vis the parent organisation (comprehensibility)
Legitimacy status
Pragmatic legitimacy
Moral / normative legitimacy
Cognitive legitimacy
CONTEXT
LEGITIMACY SEEKING BEHAVIOUR
  
Figure 2. Data structure 
20 
 
Case study analysis 
The analysis identified three main themes: (1) the legitimacy status of innovator actors 
(referring to the presence of pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacies); (2) contextual 
triggers (including structural and strategic organisational changes, changes in the degree 
of control that the innovator actor has over resources for innovation, and changes in the 
market context); and (3) legitimacy-seeking behaviours (including three legitimacy 
strategies, three legitimacy outcomes, and two legitimacy patterns) (see Figure 2). The 
next section presents the findings of the analysis separated into three narratives across 
these three themes, with exemplary quotes included in Table 2 (in appendix).  
Legitimacy status 
During the development of each product the analysis identified changes in all three types 
of legitimacy both before and after the introduction of the innovation.  
Pragmatic legitimacy 
At the beginning of the study, Secondary Unit distinguished between two product 
categories: value-adding complementary products, designed to support the company’s 
strategy by differentiating the primary product in the primary market (inbox products), 
and standalone products, designed to contribute to the company’s financial health by 
generating profits in the secondary market (outbox products). As outbox secondary 
products were significantly cheaper than primary products, their financial contribution 
was only about 1% of the company’s total revenue. Moreover, inbox secondary products 
were widely seen as standardised commodities, adding little value to the primary product. 
The Secondary Unit was thus perceived as being of little value to the company [see quote 
PL1 in Table 2 in the appendix]. 
SecPrd1 did not alter this assessment, as although well received within the parent, it 
neither added value to the primary product nor generated big sales [PL2]. The parent’s 
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assessment of the utility of secondary products, however, changed dramatically following 
the introduction of SecPrd2. SecPrd2’s range of attributes included “effortless 
functionality”; “magic feel”; “usefulness”; “non-technical, human feel”; “beautiful and 
elegantly done”; and “novelty experience” which enabled the differentiation of primary 
products in the market [PL3]. The value-added ability of SecPrd2 transferred to the 
Secondary Unit, whose utility was beginning to be acknowledged by the parent [PL4]. 
Although recognised as value-adding (exchange legitimacy), Secondary Unit lacked 
influence within the parent (influence legitimacy), as secondary products in general were 
not considered as being of strategic interest to the parent [PL5]. This changed during the 
development of SecPrd3. Although cancelled a month before it was due out for release, 
SecPrd3 was widely seen as a disruptive product for the primary market [PL6], and its 
cancellation was followed by the realisation that secondary products now fulfilled a 
strategic role for the parent. For example, following SecPrd3’s cancellation, strategic 
investment in secondary product categories was considered for the first time in the parent 
executive board [PL7], with the Secondary Unit being directly involved in the parent 
executive decision-making [PL8]. The data suggest that this mental shift was directly due 
to SecPrd3 development, as the board realised that they had failed to capitalise on the 
opportunity presented by SecPrd3 [PL9].  
Moral legitimacy 
During the study, competition in the high-end primary market moved gradually towards 
differentiation based on innovation within an ecosystem of complementary products and 
services that supported the primary product. In such a market, which was expected to 
reward innovation in complementary products, Secondary Unit was perceived to deliver 
essential, but “boring” and “standard” products, with “no particular innovation“ [ML1], 
and lacking the innovative image desired by the customers. Image problems were present 
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during the development of both SecPrd1 and SecPrd2 and partially explain the parent’s 
lack of interest in increasing the visibility of secondary products [ML2] as differentiators 
in the primary market. This evaluation of Secondary Unit’s outputs as ineffective in 
meeting market expectations affected the Secondary Unit itself, which was widely 
perceived as being undesirable within the parent [ML3]. This negative evaluation of the 
unit as “the waste reprocessing plant” was widely held at the time of SecPrd1 
development and continued after its launch, although it was somewhat reduced by the 
positive evaluations of SecPrd1 and a few other products that followed. 
Although SecPrd1 did not alter the parent’s perception of the utility of the unit, it did 
improve its assessment of secondary products’ image [ML4&5]. It was however the 
success of SecPrd2 that changed the unit’s consequential and structural legitimacy. 
Following SecPrd2 development, secondary products were seen as “cool”, “appealing”, 
“new and fresh”, and were highly visible both internally and externally. For example, 
SecPrd2 was displayed prominently both on the company website and on the company 
promotion material, alongside recent examples of the primary product, and enjoyed 
positive reports in specialist media [ML6 part 1]. Moreover, the unit itself was favourably 
categorised internally as the “right” unit to be in by the parent [ML6 part 2]. 
Following SecPrd2’s launch, the moral legitimacy crisis that the unit had faced a few 
years earlier was largely resolved. Therefore, the legitimation efforts during SecPrd3 
development did not aim to change either the normative evaluations of the image and 
visibility of secondary products or the internal reputation of the unit. 
Cognitive legitimacy 
At the outset of the study, the unit was characterised by strong cognitive misalignment 
that manifested along two dimensions: a clash between the unit’s and the parent’s models 
for organising product development, and the development of a unit identity separate from 
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the parent. Both dimensions relate to legitimacy based on comprehensibility, as both a 
particular model for organising product innovation and a specific identity provided the 
parent with plausible explanations to understand the purpose of the unit.  
The approach to organising product development in the Secondary Unit was significantly 
different from that of the Primary Unit. For example, the secondary product development 
process involved a larger number of cheaper products with shorter life-spans compared 
to the primary product development process. More broadly, the Secondary Unit relied 
extensively on outsourced manufacturing, while in-house manufacturing was typical 
within the Primary Unit. Software was more strongly represented during product 
development in the Secondary Unit compared to the Primary Unit, where hardware and 
mechanics were dominant. These differences were not simply a matter of relying on 
different procedures and techniques, as broadly the same tools and frameworks, allowing 
for local adaptations, were used across the entire organisation [CL1]. Instead, these 
differences ran much deeper, revealing different conceptualisations of how to organise 
product development as outsourcing versus insourcing based and as software rich versus 
hardware and mechanics rich. These clashes between different organising models raised 
questions about the parent’s ability to understand Secondary Unit’s activities, ultimately 
leading in 2008 to the reorganisation of Secondary Unit as a semi-autonomous unit 
separate from the Primary Unit [CL2]. The separation revealed a split in the identity of 
the Secondary Unit from the parent [CL3]. This split was still evident three years later at 
the beginning of SecPrd2 development, when some respondents felt the need to stay 
separate and semi-independent from the parent [CL4].  
SecPrd1 had no effect on cognitive legitimacy: the product was, by and large, a stand-
alone product whose development took place within Secondary Unit and required no 
integration with the primary product. There was thus no need to align with the Primary 
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Unit’s approach to product development. In contrast, SecPrd2 required the integration of 
a new technology into the primary product, and was developed in parallel with a new 
flagship primary product. The secondary and primary products were therefore developed 
in parallel, with product changes being negotiated between product teams. Secondary 
Unit adopted a collaborative development approach of “doing it together” with the 
primary product team, and “being part of the company”. The intention was to demonstrate 
the validity of the Secondary Unit through alignment with the company’s prevalent model 
for organising product development. Moreover, SecPrd2 was positioned to improve 
customers’ experiences of primary product, reflecting a change in the Secondary Unit 
mission to suppore the Primary Unit, rather than to operate as a semi-autonomous unit. 
Efforts were made to portray SecPrd2 as an integral part of the primary product value 
proposition, representing “one story, one experience”. These efforts emphasised the 
validity of SecPrd2 through its embeddedness within the primary product [CL5], and 
defined a new identity for the unit as part of the parent [CL6].  
The development of SecPrd3 did not alter the increasing sense of belonging to the parent. 
As it will be discussed in the next section, the organisational context changed dramatically 
during the development of SecPrd3, which, in contrast with the previous two products, 
relied on R&D resources from the parent. The Secondary Unit, in line with the parent and 
independently of the outcome of SecPrd2, underwent a dramatic restructuring, and a 
significant change in purpose. Under these conditions, the legitimacy problem during 
SecPrd3 was not one of separation from, or misalignment with, the parent, but one of 
questioning the identity of the unit as a whole: who are we and what do we do? The 
development of SecPrd3 did not affect this cognitive problem. 
Triggers of legitimacy-seeking behaviour through product innovation 
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The analysis reveals three categories of triggers that incentivised innovative actors to 
engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviour involving changing: (a) the unit’s strategy and 
structure; (b) internal control over resources for innovation; and (c) market context.  
Strategic and structural changes in the unit 
The first trigger involved structural and strategic changes within the unit amounting to a 
change of members’ collective sense of who they were. As was explained earlier, at the 
beginning of the study Secondary Unit fulfilled a dual purpose: both as a “service 
function” to add value to the primary products, and as a “self-sufficient group” to generate 
profits in the secondary product market. This dual focus created long standing ambiguity 
about the unit’s purpose and identity [SSC1]. The restructuring in 2008 of the Secondary 
Unit as a separate unit, maintaining its strong R&D focus and most of its personnel, 
augmented this ambiguity by formalizing the split between the unit’s identity and that of 
the parent [SSC2]. 
The structure and strategy of the unit changed dramatically before the development of 
SecPrd2. Two factors largely explained these changes. First, the parent’s declining 
performance in the primary market became evident prior to the development of SecPr2 
and intensified during subsequent years, leading to successive waves of streamlining and 
reorganisations within the company as a whole. Second, the appointment of a new leader 
in the Secondary Unit in 2010, towards the end of SecPrd1 development, was seen as the 
major driver for re-aligning the unit with the parent. 
The new unit leader set out to realign the strategy with that of the Primary Unit [SSC3] 
by focusing on high-value added secondary products that would strengthen the 
differentiation of primary products in their market [SSC4 part 1]. This strategic change 
was accompanied by restructuring the unit activities by low and high value-added product 
lines, and by the slimming the product portfolio through abandoning many low value-
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added products [SSC4 part 2]. A bigger change was the “mental shift” towards a new 
purpose that involved “integration” and “collaboration” with, and providing “support” 
to, the Primary Unit [SSC4 part 3]. The new leader redefined the role of the Secondary 
Unit as a service function supporting primary products, rather than as a separate and semi-
autonomous business unit. This purposeful re-defining effort incentivised unit members 
to seek the parent’s acceptance for this new supportive role for the unit. SecPrd2 was an 
early manifestation of this new identity and was instrumental in supporting the unit’s new 
identity legitimation efforts [SSC5]. 
While SecPrd2 development coincided with the beginning of these changes, by the time 
SecPrd3 was initiated the unit had changed both strategically and structurally away from 
an R&D focused organisation that developed and executed most of its products in house 
(at the time of SecPrd1 and SecPrd2), to a product management organisation that both 
served and relied on the Primary Unit for most of its product innovations [SSC6]. By the 
end of the study, the unit fulfilled a service function focused on conceptualising products 
exclusively to support primary products. The original identity dilemma of whether the 
unit was a service function or a self-sufficient group was resolved. 
Degree of internal control over resources for innovation 
A second trigger involved changes in the degree of control of the unit over resources for 
innovation. The degree of control depended both on the availability of resources for 
product innovation, and on the relationship between primary and secondary products. The 
ability of the unit to resource product innovation independently of the Primary Unit 
changed dramatically during the study. With around 250 staff at the time of SecPrd1 and 
200 at the time of SecPrd2, the unit conducted all product development and execution in 
house. There was no requirement to seek Primary Unit’s support for product 
development, and thus no strong incentives to engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviour 
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[CRI1]. Value-added products were also generally prioritized and resourced within the 
unit [CRI2]. Support from Primary Unit was required only to align product development 
across the two units by, for example, including relevant technologies or features needed 
to support secondary product functionality in the primary product. Under conditions of 
resource independence, it was the nature of the relationship between the secondary and 
primary products which triggered legitimacy-seeking behaviour in the unit. Where such 
alignments were not significant, as in the case of SecPrd1, which relied on interface 
technology already embedded in the primary product, there was no incentive to seek 
legitimacy from the Primary Unit [CRI3]. In contrast, SecPrd2 was developed in parallel 
with a new primary product and required the introduction of a new technology in the 
primary product. SecPrd2 development thus required the support of the Primary Unit to 
implement these changes [CRI4]. 
At the time of SecPrd3 development the resource context changed dramatically. Not only 
did the unit identity change to be a service function, but the unit had around 30 R&D 
personnel, and was entirely dependent on the Primary Unit [CRI5]. Legitimacy-seeking 
behaviour was necessary to convince the Primary Unit to divert resources from their own 
products to develop the secondary product. 
Change in market context 
The third trigger was the perceived change in the primary product market context, which 
affected both the strategic relationship between primary and secondary products, and the 
discourse surrounding the role of secondary products in the market. Prior to SecPrd1 
development, the high-end of the primary product market had expanded gradually, albeit 
remaining smaller than the low-end segment. This expansion generated an increase in the 
secondary product market. Higher sales of secondary products were also generating 
higher demand for additional features in primary products. In 2007, market reports were 
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predicting a steady increase in the secondary product market over the next five years. 
Primary products producers were keen to create synergies between their secondary and 
primary products and to use the growth in the secondary market to support higher sales 
in the high-end primary market. This symbiotic relationship between secondary and 
primary products was just emerging during SecPrd1 development.  
However, the development of SecPrd1 was driven primarily by expectations for future 
growth in the secondary product market, rather than by any expectations of either 
exploiting these emerging synergies between secondary and primary product or 
generating revenues from SecPrd1 sales [MC1]. SecPrd1 was positioned as a standalone 
product in the secondary market, not as a value-adding product for the primary product. 
As such, there was no incentive for the unit to seek Primary Unit’s support for SecPrd1. 
By the time of SecPrd2 development, the market for high value-added secondary products 
that supported primary products [MC2] was already well-established and growing. 
Increasing customer expectations for more and better complementary offerings [MC3] 
also led to a significant change in discourse within the market as a whole towards 
secondary products as value-enhancing innovations both from a strategic perspective, i.e. 
supporting differentiation, and from a normative perspective, i.e. conforming to the 
market expectations for “awesome” secondary products to enhance the primary products. 
This discourse contrasted significantly with the previous market assessment of secondary 
products as low value, essential and functional complementary products. However, the 
Primary Unit, which had enjoyed a strong position in the primary market, was slow in 
adapting to these changes maintaining an undistinguished secondary product offering, 
and was losing market share [MC4]. 
By the time of SecPrd3 development, primary products were largely commoditised, and 
the source of value creation was shifting towards add-on services and secondary products. 
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The utility of secondary products was now being seen as linked not to their ability to 
differentiate the primary product, but to their disruptive potential [MC5]. SecPrd1 was 
thus developed at the outset of significant shifts in the market which were just beginning 
to be addressed by the market actors. In contrast, SecPrd2 and SecPrd3 were developed 
during widely recognised dramatic shifts in the market where secondary products were 
becoming increasingly critical to value creation.  
Legitimacy-seeking behaviours in product innovation 
In response to the triggers outlined above, the analysis identified three mechanisms that 
innovator actors used purposefully to legitimise their innovation. These mechanisms are 
discussed below in relation to the type of legitimacy (pragmatic, moral and cognitive) and 
legitimacy strategies (conforming, selection and manipulation) outlined by Suchman 
(1995). As discussed earlier, at the time of SecPrd2, although the unit lacked legitimacy, 
contextual triggers were absent. Legitimacy-seeking behaviour occurred only for SecPrd2 
and SecPrd3 when contextual triggers were present. 
Lobbying 
The development of SecPrd2 and SecPrd3 was characterised by extensive lobbying 
activities to influence the assessment of secondary products by corporate product 
sponsors. Lobbying included technical demonstrations and product presentations, and 
regular communication. Lobbying was associated with a manipulation strategy to attain 
pragmatic legitimacy (SecPrd2 and SecPrd3), and with conforming strategy to attain 
moral legitimacy (SecPrd2). 
Technical demonstrations and/or product presentation were used by innovation actors as 
a product advertising mechanism to develop a compelling story around the product early 
in development. For example, technical demonstrations were used to emphasise, and 
sometimes exaggerate, the value-added features of SecPrd2, including usability [LB1] 
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and multi-functionality [LB2], while SecPrd3 product presentations emphasised the 
complementary nature of SecPrd3 vis-à-vis the primary product [LB3]. For both products, 
respondents referred to these lobbying efforts as “creating an aspirational story” to “sell” 
the product internally through portraying secondary products as useful to the parent 
because of their potential to support the primary product strategy [M-LB1][M-LB2][M-
LB3]. Product advertising was targeted to change stakeholders’ perceptions that the 
innovation served their interests by supporting differentiation in primary products. It was 
thus associated with manipulation strategy to gain pragmatic legitimacy. 
For SecPrd2, product advertising was also used to emphasise conformity with the 
corporate expectations for the “right kind” of product. Informants discussed how they 
used presentations and technical demos to construct a story emphasising product 
characteristics such as “cool” and “great”, and having a “huge” impact on the market [C-
LB1], and to demonstrate alignment with product expectations [C-LB2]. Thus lobbying 
by product advertising was also associated with conforming strategies to gain moral 
legitimacy. 
Lobbying also involved informal regular communication between the two units to 
reinforce product advertising. For SecPrd2, where development was done within the unit 
and in parallel with the development of a new primary product, regular communication 
between the units’ product teams was required throughout development to align customer 
requirements and product specifications, and to address technical integration issues, and 
during launch between the two products’ marketing and sales teams. These regular 
communications at operational levels went beyond the normal interaction required by the 
systemic nature of SecPrd2 development, and served to maintain the momentum and 
reinforce product advertising activities [LB4]. 
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 As SecPrd3 was developed mostly with resources from the Primary Unit, regular 
communication between Primary and Secondary Units was required at the senior 
management level at the outset of product development to gain Primary Unit commitment 
to invest in the product, and later to ensure the allocation of resources to continue product 
development. As with SecPrd2, communication reinforced other lobbying efforts, mostly 
to lay out the ground for formal product presentations [LB5]. 
Relationship building 
Relationship building involved two activities: informal networking throughout the parent 
to create a critical mass of supporters of the product, and external collaborations to 
leverage external partners’ legitimacy. Relationship building was associated with both 
conforming (externally; SecPrd2) and selection (internally; SecPrd2 and SecPrd3) to gain 
moral legitimacy, and to a lesser extent with selection (internally) to achieve cognitive 
legitimacy (SecPrd2). 
Two of the SecPrd2 category products were co-developed and co-branded with external 
partners. This collaboration was instigated by the new leader appointed prior to SecPrd2 
development, and was unique within the company. All respondents emphasised that, 
while the unit had the technical competencies to develop these products in-house, it 
lacked a credible consumer brand outside the primary product market. The association 
with a strong consumer brand was thus the main driver for these external collaborations 
which sought to leverage the partners’ image [RB1] to align SecPrd2 with the normative 
expectations for the “right kind of product” [C-RB1], i.e. “inspirational” having “non-
technology feel”, with a “cool” and “best brand” image, and high market visibility. 
External relationship-building thus allowed the unit to gain moral legitimacy by 
signalling conformity with existing product expectation.  
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Internally, both SecPrd2 and SecPrd3 involved extensive networking activities to identify 
and select audiences that were receptive to the norms and values embedded in the 
products, and thus willing to support the innovation. While targeting receptive audiences 
was important for SecPrd2 to garner company wide support for making changes in the 
primary product [RB2], it was essential for SecPrd3 whose development depended on 
resources from the Primary Unit [RB3]. Networking was used purposefully to selectively 
mobilise internal actors to support the products and push for its completion [S-RB1][S-
RB2]. Internal networking was thus part of selecting strategies to target receptive 
audiences by signalling alignment with their normative expectations (moral legitimacy).  
To a lesser extent, internal networking was also used by SecPrd2 actors to demonstrate 
compliance with the prevalent model of product development within the parent. The 
strategic and operational integration of SecPrd2 with the primary product required close 
collaboration between the secondary and primary development teams [RB4]. This 
collaboration was purposefully managed by the Secondary Unit management to support 
the re-positioning of the unit as closely aligned with and part of the parent [C-RB2]. Close 
collaboration with the Primary Unit during NPD was desired by the parent’s executive 
management, conforming to their assumptions of a company business model built around 
the Primary Unit. Internal relationship building thus allowed the Secondary Unit to gain 
cognitive legitimacy by conforming to the corporate prevalent organisational model. 
Seeking feedback 
Seeking feedback involved conducting ad-hoc internal testing of products and formal 
external market and/or customer studies. Seeking feedback was associated with selection 
for moral legitimacy (internal feedback; SecPrd2) and conforming for pragmatic 
legitimacy (external feedback; SecPrd2 and SecPrd3). 
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Internal ad-hoc product testing was used extensively during SecPrd2 and targeted two 
types of internal audiences: engineers as “professional colleagues”, and decision markers 
as “business stakeholders”. In both cases feedback involved personal testing of early 
working prototypes and served to identify whether the product idea conformed to 
professional standards for product innovation and performance within the professional 
engineering community [SF1], or with the expected product criteria within the company, 
These criteria included ease of advertising and selling for the marketing community, and 
ease of use and functionality for the business owners of related primary product [SF2]. 
The ad-hoc internal testing allowed innovator actors to identify the kind of corporate 
sponsors that would see the innovation as desirable based on its alignment with their 
normative expectations of what a company product should be [S-SF1]. 
External feedback was used to demonstrate the utility of both SecPrd2 and SecPrd3 to the 
parent, either because the product added value to the primary product (SecPrd2) [SF3], 
or because it represented an innovation expected by the market (SecPrd3) [SF4]. External 
feedback included customer and market studies, and feedback from retailers. External 
feedback was targeted for both products to demonstrate to organisational members the 
utility of the innovation through alignment with the parent’s strategic interests [C-
SF1][C-SF2]. 
Trade-offs and Interdependencies across mechanisms 
The deployment of legitimacy-seeking mechanisms was characterised by trade-offs 
between different legitimacy outcomes, and interdependencies between different 
legitimacy mechanisms and strategies to reinforce particular legitimacy outcomes.  
Trade-offs involve actors deploying a particular legitimacy mechanism as part of a 
particular legitimacy strategy to gain one type of legitimacy at the expense of other type, 
e.g. engaging in relationship building as part of conforming to gain moral legitimacy at 
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the expense of cognitive legitimacy. Two trade-offs are identified here: between 
prioritising pragmatic legitimacy on the one hand, versus moral (SecPrd2) and cognitive 
(SecPrd3) legitimacy on the other; and between prioritising moral legitimacy at the 
expense of cognitive legitimacy (SecPrd2).  
First, manipulation in the form of lobbying through product advertising served to 
convince the corporate audiences of the strategic value of both SecPrd2 and SecPrd3 by 
prioritising pragmatic legitimacy over other forms of legitimacy. For example, SecPrd2 
presentations emphasised end-user value-added product attributes such as ease of use, 
which supported the differentiation story while downplaying features that did not match 
the norms for the “right kind” of environmentally sustainable product prevalent within 
the company, such as lower energy efficiency [TO1]. Similarly, SecPrd3 presentations 
emphasised the complementary nature of SecPrd3, which served the parent’s strategic 
interests, but refrained from discussing the long term disruptive effect that SecPrd3 would 
have on the company’s prevalent business model [TO2]. In both cases, innovator actors 
consciously made a trade-off between seeking pragmatic legitimacy through changing 
internal judgments of secondary product value while downplaying other forms of 
legitimacy, such as moral legitimacy (SecPrd2), and cognitive legitimacy (SecPrd3).  
Second, in the case of SecPrd2, external relationship building was deployed to conform 
to the expected standards for product innovation within the market. In doing so, however, 
the unit departed quite significantly from the real practices, knowledge and assumptions 
that underpinned product development in the company. External collaboration during 
product development was considered appropriate only to allow access to technological or 
manufacturing capabilities that the company lacked, and typically products were 
developed exclusively under the company brand. The Secondary Unit’s decision to 
collaborate to co-brand SecPrd2 therefore violated the existing organisational model and 
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faced significant resistance throughout the company [TO3]. External relationship 
building thus involved a trade-off between conforming to the normative expectations of 
what was “the right kind” of product versus departing from the taken for granted 
procedures and assumptions for in-house product development. 
Interdependencies manifest when one legitimacy mechanism is deployed to reinforce 
another mechanism with the aim to gain a particular type of legitimacy, for example 
seeking feedback (to signal conformity) is used to reinforce lobbying (deployed as part 
of manipulation strategy) to gain pragmatic legitimacy. Two types of interdependencies 
were identified in this case, to reinforce the same legitimacy outcome (SecPrd2 and 3) 
and to reinforce a different legitimacy outcome (SecPrd3). 
First, during both SecPrd2 and SecPrd3, gathering feedback from external stakeholders 
to demonstrate that the product added value to the primary offering was subsequently 
used to support the unit’s lobbying efforts to manipulate the perceptions of internal 
stakeholders about the pragmatic legitimacy of its product innovation. Successful 
manipulation of internal stakeholders therefore depended in part on whether the product 
conformed to the established interests of external audiences [ID1][ID2]. 
Second, internal networking with selective audiences to support SecPrd3 based on the 
product alignment with their normative expectations of “the right kind of product” and 
was instrumental in preparing the ground for strategic lobbying. The product team 
leveraged this selective internal support to lobby senior management within the company 
in order to convince them of the benefits that SecPrd3 brings to the company [ID3].  
Discussions and findings 
 Institutional literature in general, and research on product innovation in particular, 
assumes that legitimacy-seeking behaviour emerges in response to legitimacy crises 
created by the radical nature of the innovation itself as it departs from existing 
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organisational norms and values and introduces high uncertainty (Dougherty and Heller, 
1994; Kannan-Narasimhan, 2014; Takeishi, Aoshima and Karube, 2010). This study 
found that legitimacy crises prior to product innovation provided the background on 
which contextual triggers prompted innovation actors to respond by engaging in 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour. Three such contextual triggers were identified in this case: 
structural and strategic organisational changes, changes in the degree of control of 
resources for innovation, and changes in the market (RQ1). This research thus further 
develops institutional research on product innovation by demonstrating the role that 
context plays not only in shaping the types of legitimation strategies deployed (Van Dijk 
et al., 2011) and their success (Vermeulen, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2007), but also 
in triggering these strategies in the first place. 
NPD research largely emphasises the need for strategic alignment between product 
innovation and firm strategy (Kester, Hultink and Griffin, 2014; Kahn et al., 2012). As 
expected, this study found that persuading internal audiences that the product fitted the 
firm’s strategic interests through adding value was important in allowing innovator actors 
to acquire resources during product development. Such pragmatic legitimacy was, 
however, not sufficient. Seeking moral and cognitive legitimacy emerged as important 
strategies to gain corporate acceptance for the innovation. These findings highlight the 
importance of considering both the range of legitimacy outcomes that innovator actors 
rely on to resource their product innovation, and strategic, rational based approaches 
(RQ2).  
Existing institutional research has broadly examined the high level strategies that 
innovator actors engage in to legitimise their product idea (Dougherty and Heller, 1994; 
Van Dijk et al., 2011). Building upon this research, this study found that legitimacy 
strategies manifested through a range of lower-level mechanisms that actors used 
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purposefully during product innovation to seek different kinds of legitimacy. The study 
identified three such mechanisms: lobbying, relationship building and seeking feedback, 
and unearthed a number of complex ways in which these mechanisms and strategies 
intertwined to achieve their intended outcome (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Legitimacy mechanisms, strategies and outcomes 
Further, the analysis shows that legitimacy-seeking behaviour involved a combination of 
mechanisms and strategies to achieve different legitimacies outcomes. The effort was, 
however, not equally distributed across all three types of legitimacy outcomes (horizontal 
rows in Figure 3). For example the most complex combination was employed to seek 
moral legitimacy and involved all three types of mechanisms and two legitimacy 
strategies. In contrast, cognitive legitimacy was sought only by demonstrating 
conformance to the existing prevalent cultural model through internal relationship 
building. These findings do not support Floren and Fishammar’s (2012) 
recommendations that during the fuzzy front end of product innovation, strategic 
alignment activities should take priority over legitimation efforts to gain commitment for 
the innovation idea. In contrast, this study found that both moral and pragmatic legitimacy 
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were strongly sought by the innovator actor. The reduced effort that the actor dedicated 
to enhancing cognitive legitimacy vis-a-vis moral legitimacy was in line with institutional 
research findings that suggest that cognitive legitimacy is the most difficult legitimacy to 
influence by strategic actions (Suchman, 1995). Conforming was also found to be by far 
the most extensively pursued strategy, followed by selection and manipulation (vertical 
columns in Figure 3). This finding reinforces Van Dijk et al. (2011) findings that in a 
homogenous institutional environment, which the unit studied here seemed to be, 
conforming is more likely to be deployed.  
This study also found that legitimacy mechanisms, strategies and outcomes intertwined 
in complex ways during product innovation, thus exposing legitimacy-seeking behaviour 
as a much more complex phenomenon than the high-level legitimacy strategies portrayed 
in existing research (e.g. Dougherty and Heller, 1994). For example lobbying was used 
both to conform and to manipulate in order to gain pragmatic legitimacy, while 
conforming involved both lobbying and relationship building to seek both pragmatic and 
moral legitimacy (cells in Figure 3). The result of this intertwining was a range of patterns 
that characterised legitimacy-seeking behaviour and included trade-offs (↕) and 
interdependencies (→) between mechanisms and strategies to pursue different legitimacy 
outcomes. Two trade-offs were identified: between moral and cognitive legitimacy during 
external relationship building; and between pragmatic on one side and moral and 
cognitive legitimacy on the other during lobbying. The trade-offs for the innovator actor 
studied here prioritised pragmatic over both moral and cognitive legitimacy, and moral 
over cognitive. These findings could indicate that innovator actors develop a hierarchy of 
legitimacy outcomes where they prioritise some outcomes over others. 
This study also found that interdependencies existed between different legitimacy-
seeking strategies. The findings identified two kinds of interdependencies, both of which 
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were used to reinforce pragmatic legitimacy. One involved selection strategy through 
gathering feedback used to reinforce manipulation strategy through lobbying. The second 
involved selection strategy by networking to gain moral legitimacy deployed to reinforce 
pragmatic legitimacy by supporting lobbying efforts to signal conformity. These findings 
indicate that during product innovation, actors engaged in a carefully choreographed 
dance of conforming to, selection and manipulation of internal audiences by lobbying, 
relationship building and seeking feedback to gain different kinds of internal legitimacy. 
(RQ3)  
Finally, this study also included a time dimension as legitimacy-seeking behaviour was 
studied as it evolved over time in order to capture the contextual changes that shaped the 
actions of the innovation unit. At the beginning of SecPrd1, superficial structural changes 
and emergent, but still largely unacknowledged market changes did not provide sufficient 
incentive for the innovator actor to engage in legitimacy-seeking behaviour, despite the 
lack of legitimacy status that characterised the unit. As such, no legitimacy mechanisms 
were observed during SecPrd1. Nevertheless, SecPrd1 improved the image of the unit 
within the parent, adding somewhat to the moral legitimacy of the actor. Against the 
backdrop of continued legitimacy crises, major structural and strategic changes and the 
increased acknowledgment of dramatic shifts in the market incentivised the unit to engage 
in legitimacy-seeking behaviour during SecPrd2 development. This behaviour involved 
conforming through lobbying, internal and external relationship building and seeking 
feedback; selecting through targeting internal relational networking and seeking 
feedback; and manipulation through lobbying. This behaviour led to significant 
improvements in all forms of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral and cognitive. As a result, at 
the outset of SecPrd3 development, the legitimacy crisis experienced during the previous 
two products was largely resolved. Nevertheless, ongoing changes both within the unit 
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and in the market, as well as drastic changes in the unit’s control over resources for 
innovation incentivised innovator actors to continue to seek legitimacy. Legitimacy-
seeking behaviour at this stage involved conforming through seeking feedback; selection 
through internal relationship building; and manipulation through lobbying. These efforts 
result in a further improvement in the unit’s pragmatic legitimacy at the end of SecPrd3 
development. The analysis shows how, following product innovation, an innovator 
actor’s legitimacy status changes, providing a different setting for contextual triggers to 
initiate another constellation of legitimacy strategies, mechanism and patterns. Over time, 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour can be reinforcing, as innovator actors rely on previously 
gained legitimacy to alter the legitimacy status and affect positive changes in the context. 
Conclusions 
Contributions to theory  
At theoretical level this study has developed a framework of legitimacy-seeking 
behaviour in product innovation that offers a complementary view to the rational choice 
perspective (e.g. Kahn et al., 2012) to examine the actions of product innovator actors in 
established organisations. Building upon existing institutional research on product 
innovation, this study argues that legitimacy-seeking behaviour to resource product 
innovation is based on institutional dynamics between the innovator actor and corporate 
sponsors, rather than (solely) on strategic alignment rationales. The framework developed 
here extends institutional research on product innovation in at least two ways. 
First, the framework further elucidate the role that context plays in shaping legitimacy-
seeking behaviour in product innovation. Existing research focuses on the constraints that 
the institutional context places on actors’ ability to deploy legitimacy strategies for radical 
innovation (Van Dijk et al., 2011) and on the success to support incremental innovation 
(Vermeulen, Van den Bosch and Volberda, 2007). Instead, the framework developed here 
41 
 
examines the organisational and market context in which an innovator actor is embedded 
and finds that the context plays a critical role in triggering legitimacy-seeking behaviour 
in the first place. While institutional literature emphasises legitimacy crises as triggers for 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour (e.g. Suchman, 1995), the findings from this study show 
that legitimacy crises serve as the backdrop against which a range of contextual factors 
act to instigate legitimacy-seeking behaviour. The influence of three types of contextual 
triggers is identified and explained: structural and strategic changes within the innovator 
actor, changes in the degree of resource dependency, and changes in the market. 
Second, the framework allows a granular analysis of legitimacy-seeking behaviour 
beyond the high-level legitimacy strategies and monolithic legitimacy outcome concepts 
that characterise current research on product innovation (Dougherty and Heller, 1994; 
Van Dijk et al., 2011). The findings identify three types of legitimacy-seeking 
mechanisms (lobbying, relationship building and seeking feedback) that are deployed 
both simultaneously and sequentially. This study thus adds to the range of legitimacy 
strategies (conformity, selection and manipulation) and types of legitimacy outcomes 
(pragmatic, moral and cognitive) conceptualised in existing research (Suchman, 1995). 
Complex patterns of trade-offs and interdependencies between strategies, mechanisms 
and outcomes characterise legitimacy-seeking behaviour and explain how innovator 
actors access corporate resources to advance their product idea in established 
organisations.  
The study also begins to consider the evolution of legitimacy-seeking behaviour over 
time. A time perspective is largely missing in institutional research on product innovation, 
with most research taking a static view and using the product as the unit of analysis. This 
study instead takes a dynamic view and examine the changes in context, legitimacy-
seeking behaviour and outcomes over seven years. This time perspective allows the 
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analysis to identify the links between different legitimacy behaviours and legitimacy 
status across product innovation cycles as gains in legitimacy following one product 
development alter the context for the next. More research is required to elucidate the 
nature of these links across time.  
Managerial implications 
For product innovation practice, the study offers a better understanding of how to gather 
resources and support for product innovation. Product managers exist in a world in which 
organisational performance is important, and NPD best practices are devised and 
promoted as ways to maximise such performance. But this world is also inhabited by 
intra-organisational politics, compromises and negotiations, expectations of what 
organisations should do and what products should look like, and embedded cultural 
models of what the organisation should represent. Gathering support for product ideas is 
thus contingent not only on an actors’ ability to demonstrate the utility of a product, but 
also on their ability to demonstrate alignment with the normative expectations and the 
prevalent cultural models within their organisation. Moreover, conformity is only one of 
many approaches to legitimise a product idea. Actors have at their disposal an array of 
strategies to choose from that can be implemented through a range of mechanisms 
targeting different forms of legitimacy. The framework developed here can guide product 
managers in choosing from a wide range of option to devise more effective efforts to 
promote their product innovation. Combining different mechanisms as part of varied 
strategies, and targeting multiple legitimacies is likely to be more efficient than focusing 
solely on conforming to prove product utility as recommended by best practice studies. 
Also, the framework developed here sensitises innovator actors to the trade-offs and 
interdependencies involved in legitimacy-seeking efforts, so that combinations of 
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mechanisms and strategies can be used strategically to target particular legitimacy 
outcomes. 
Limitations and future research 
A common critique of case study research is the lack of generalisability. The purpose of 
case studies is, however, never to develop generalizable findings in the positivistic sense, 
but rather to achieve in-depth understanding of a particular phenomenon. This in-depth 
understanding is obtained by building a thick description of the case so that it is possible 
to compare the elements of the study, and the theory and concepts generated, with other 
situations (Schofield, 2002).  
This research has also a number of limitations. First, only three instances of product 
innovation over seven years within a single organisation are examined here. While this 
approach allowed the study to gain a thick description of the case and to explore in-depth 
the interaction between contextual triggers and legitimacy-seeking behaviour as it 
unfolded over time, it covered only one organisational setting: a marginal unit in a large 
established organisation operating in a fast-changing market. Future research could 
expand the framework to other settings, such as primary units, or actors with different 
legitimacy status. Further efforts to expand the framework through a quantitative study 
to test the presence of the mechanisms and the prevalence of the patterns identified here 
would also add significant value to this research. Second, the study has only begun to 
explore the evolution of legitimacy-seeking behaviour over time. The research design 
allowed the study to track the changes in contextual factors to examine their role in 
triggering in legitimacy-seeking behaviour for the innovator actor. There is opportunity 
here for further research to examine the role of context in shaping the patterns of 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour over time: which strategies and mechanisms are more 
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likely to be employed under which contexts, with what likely outcomes, and how do these 
behaviours develop over time?  
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Appendix 
Table 2. Themes with supportive quotes 
 Illustrative quotes 
LEGITIMACY STATUS 
Pragmatic 
legitimacy 
[PL1-9] 
Perceived strategic value of secondary product & unit (exchange legitimacy) 
 SecPrd1 
“we were [making] commodity products where the value added to [the company’s] overall 
business was quite limited […] nobody [from the parent organisation] really frankly was 
interested [in our products] and, I think it was fair to say, there was no connection between 
being successful in [the secondary unit] to help [the company] succeed”. (Stage2, sales 
director) [PL1] 
“if we wanted to make money it was better to invest in [another product category] rather 
than in [SecPrd1]”. (Stage3, business owner) [PL2] 
 SecPrd2 
“[the product manager for the primary product] was super excited of [SecPrd2]. So he 
kind of saw that this is actually the main differentiator that he is able to bring into his 
[primary product]”. (Stage 2, product manager) [PL3] 
“we are [now] kind of valued, respected inside the company. And people are interested of 
us and they see that we are super important and bring value”. (Stage 2, product manager) 
[PL4] 
 “there is not push from higher level top management that now you need to do this kind of 
accessories.” (Stage 2, innovation senior manager) [PL5] 
Participation in strategic decision making within the parent (influence legitimacy) 
 SecPrd3 
“this [product] had the potential to disrupt … the market of the main product actually. It 
was not disrupting the complementary product. It was and it is perceived still as it had 
possibilities to disrupt the whole consumer behaviour.” (Stage 3, business owner) [PL6] 
“it’s a huge mental shift for that Board to start talking about: Actually it looks like our 
next revenue stream is coming from this [secondary unit] product category, rather than 
from our main business. That shift, from what I see now, it’s coming.” (Stage 3, business 
owner) [PL7] 
“[The head of secondary unit] was shocked that he remained in the team and said: this is 
a unit of which until a few years ago everyone was questioning whether we kill or not 
because it does not bring us any money. And now, during this major re-organisation, when 
so many people lost their job, the fact that he, from this minor unit, is one of the few that 
remained [in the leadership team] is a very big signal for all the organisation of how 
relevant [secondary products] are.” (Stage 3, business owner) [PL8] 
“the mindset had changed […] because they were like: “What are the white spaces?” And 
they didn’t identify only this, like, specifically, that my product category [SecPrd3 
category]: “Ok, it’s not that specific product category. Tell us what else, because we 
screwed up with that one. So tell us what else.” (Stage 3, business owner) [PL9] 
Moral 
legitimacy 
[ML1-6] 
Internal and external image of the secondary product (consequential legitimacy) 
 SecPrd1&2 
“the business was really about selling batteries in India […]essentially we were very 
standard, there was no particular innovation in those products. In fact, we were [doing], 
how to say, uninspirational commodity products”. (Stage 2, sales director) [ML1] 
Internal and external visibility of the secondary product (consequential legitimacy) 
 SecPrd1&2 
“the sales and marketing for [the parent] products is a big obstacle, so the publicity that 
our products [has] is not that high and the marketing organisation of [the parent] is 
primarily developed to sell [primary products].” (Stage 1, quality director) [ML2] 
 SecPrd2 
“the visibility of our product launches is completely different nowadays. So even the 
feedback we get from the press even, or the bloggers … there was hardly any back in the 
days. But nowadays if there is a launch, it is interesting and there is going to be a great 
fuss around it. …”. [ML6 part 1] (Stage 2, business owner 2) 
Reputation / profile of the unit within the parent (structural legitimacy) 
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 SecPrd1&2 
“like the waste reprocessing plant we used to be, like here is the final destination before 
you go out of the building. Which we used to be. Like if you get fired, then the second worst 
is then [this business unit].” (Stage 2, business owner 1) [ML3] 
 SecPrd1 
“it was a proof point for the unit that we actually can do something beautiful. It did not 
create too much outside buzz, but it was one of the first products that was well received 
by the mother unit that: yes, you have done something beautiful, something else than [low 
value products] that we had enough of that you were doing 100 of those. What it did was 
to change the perception [in the primary unit] and it paved the way for [SecPrd2].” (Stage 
3, business owner) [ML4] 
“I think that with the [one version of SecPrd2] it wasn’t difficult because the [SecPrd1] 
was already there, people liked that staff”(Stage 2, business owner 1) [ML5] 
 SecPrd2 
“… So I believe that those are one factor that kind of makes us maybe feel a bit more proud 
that we are doing what we are doing. And also that we are kind of valued, respected inside 
the company”. (Stage 2, business owner 2) [ML6 part 2] 
Cognitive 
legitimacy 
[CL1-7] 
Model of organising NPD in the unit vis-à-vis the parent (comprehensibility) 
 SecPrd1 
“we are quite independent from other parts of [the company] so we can and are allowed 
to define our own processes, as we like. So the current process is based of course on [the 
company’s] processes because we need to speak the same language […] we are using the 
same milestones as [the parent] but a bit different because typically the development cycle 
of our product is much shorter [...]We don’t have that luxury to have for every task our 
own expert, and therefore we had to tailor this process so that we can manage things in 
sensible ways ” (Stage 1, quality director) [CL1] 
“it was not possible to integrate [Secondary Unit] within [Primary Unit] because they 
have completely different processes. They have completely different lines for 
manufacturing and software, [so] it was acknowledged that the current structure does not 
work.” (Stage 1, R&D manager) [CL2] 
Unit identity vis-à-vis the parent (comprehensibility) 
 SecPrd1 
 “hopefully we will be left alone to do our job” (Stage 2, technology&innovation senior 
manager) [CL3] 
“we had good reasons to stay separate. Like, yeah, let’s have our own sales force because 
if we don’t have it, nobody is going to sell this stuff. And then let’s have our own marketing 
force, because if we don’t have it, nobody is going to market the stuff.” (Stage 2, business 
owner SP1) (Stage2, business owner 1) [CL4] 
 SecPrd2 
“[Secondary Unit] was also having kind of strong wish to do something that we didn’t do 
earlier. Our wish was to do it together as a one company. Make kind of an experience that 
it is not a separate accessory, separate [primary product], but it’s one story, one 
experience.” (Stage 2, business owner 2) [CL5] 
“we used to often talk about [secondary unit] strategy because we used to be this kind of 
this independent and not really relevant for the rest the company, so we’re talking about 
how we’ll grow. But in fact the point is that now [after the launch of SecPrd2], even when 
I’m discussing [the unit strategy], I’m actually talking about [secondary unit] as part of 
[company] strategy. (Stage 2, sales director) [CL6] 
TRIGGERS OF LEGITIMACY SEEKING BEHAVIOUR 
Structural 
and 
strategic 
changes 
[SSC1-6] 
Changes in structure, cleaning product portfolio and re-positioning the unit 
 SecPrd1 
“within [the parent], [the secondary unit] has this kind of dilemmas, that you know is it 
the service function that provide devices like accessories for our [primary product]? On 
the other hand is it a self-sufficient group where they try to make profit and therefore make 
its own portfolios and design their own product.” (Stage 1, R&D senior manager) [SSC1] 
“of course, people are asking questions about what the future is. I don’t think people are 
asking questions about ‘do they have a job?’ I don’t think that’s the question.  I think the 
question is ‘what will their job be?’.” (Stage 1, R&D senior manager) [SSC2] 
 SecPrd2 
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“the first change we did [was] on product strategies that yes, we can do cool, colourful, 
end to end, integrated, aspirational [products] [...] so creating products which then 
together with the [primary product] are more than the sum of the part [...] And these were 
not trivial choices. Because it was contrary to everything that had been done before. …” 
(Stage 2, business owner 1) [SSC4 part 1] 
“… [leading to] huge clean up in products, reduction in staff, cleaning up of processes”, 
“setting up the high value organisation to give more focus on the high end stuff”, “re-
establishing product teams” (Stage 2, business owner 1) [SSC4 part 2] 
 SecPrd1&2&3 
“when we were doing [SecPrd2] we started to have a bit less resources in R&D but we 
still had a lot. What [the head of the unit] changed is that he said: this unit does not need 
R&D, it needs product managers and lobbying and they can work with the R&D from the 
[primary unit] and the engineers there can help us, that we only with R&D did not manage 
to do anything. So the unit was marginal as long as it had 200 people in R&D and 
practically it was not doing anything. So he reduced the R&D and when he left [during 
SecPrd3 early stages] we had 20 engineers.” (Stage 3, business owner) [SSC6] 
Strategic re-alignment with the parent company 
 SecPrd2 
“we were keen [to] support the [company’s] value proposition that what they want to be, 
so meaning that when a new [primary product] is launched on the high end, that we 
wanted to be part of it, we wanted to kind of make it even better with our accessories.” 
(Stage 2, business owner 1) [SSC3] 
“… a conscious choice to collaborate [with the primary unit]”.  (Stage 2) [SSC4 part 3] 
 “without [secondary unit] team new direction and willingness to work more together, 
collaborate more and then aim to support exactly those [primary products’] key selling 
points and key value propositions and all that, it would have been so much harder to get 
to this stage where we are [launching SecPrd2].” (Stage 2, business owner 2) [SSC5] 
Change in 
the degree 
of control 
over 
resources 
for 
innovation 
[CRI1-5] 
Availability of R&D resources internally for product execution 
 SecPrd1,2&3 
“We in 2010 were still able to do [products] with our own resources without having to go 
[to Primary Unit] and lobby for them. So we were independent from the engineering point 
of view. So we could have done them with the people we had internally.”  (Stage 3, business 
owner) [CRI1] 
 SecPrd1 
“The approach [win Secondary Unit] is to maximise the inbox [products], but we need to 
do outbox [products] as well. [It is only] for the outbox products, when we start we need 
to negotiate the priorities for the money and resources.” (Stage 1, R&D director) [CRI2] 
The operation & strategic relationship between primary & secondary products 
 SecPrd1 
“[for SecPrd1] they did not need to change anything in the [primary product]”. (Stage 3, 
business owner) [CRI3] 
 SecPrd2 
“when we were doing [SecPrd2] we still had R&D. We needed the link with the [Primary 
Product] because of the technology that had to be implemented on the other side, not 
because we did not have the people to make it.” (Stage 3, business owner) [CRI4] 
 SecPrd3 
“if the organisational context would have been the same as in 2010, I could have done my 
product without having to go outside and ask for resources. I could have done it and put 
it on the table and say: look what I have done to you and this will change your industry 
[…] In 2013 I did not have any engineers left, practically. So my only chance of starting 
this [product] category was to go and say: you need this category, give me resources or 
else I cannot do anything.” (Stage 3, business owner) [CRI5] 
Change in 
market 
context 
[MC1-5] 
Changes in the market demand & competition 
 SecPrd1 
“the market for [SecPrd1] when we started to do it was very small. So it just begun to exist 
as a market […] the market increased in the meantime and now there are lots of [SecPrd1 
type products]. But it was not a matter of: there is a consumer need. It was more a matter 
of: the technology [embedded in SecPrd1] is quite advanced and we can do it at prices 
that are ok for the consumer. But if we want to make money it is better to invest in [another 
product category]”.  (Stage 3, business owner) [MC1] 
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 SecPrd2 
“[the secondary unit] was very much focusing in 2010 still on, I will say traditional 
[complementary products]. And the majority of money were coming from [two categories 
of low value high value complementary products]. Both markets started to go downs. And 
then it was obvious we need to look, in order to keep our level of profitability and revenue, 
we need to look into new [secondary product] categories. ” (Stage 2, 
technology&innovation senior manager) [MC2] 
“consumers are looking to get more out of their [primary product]. […] the consumers 
have now learnt that there can be really cool accessories and they have often become 
hooked,[...] and now if you try to just sell the [primary product], I would claim that 
compared with five years ago, your [primary product] offering will look a lot poorer 
without something around it”. (Stage 2, marketing director) [MC3] 
“[competitor] has come to the market and enabled with their success a massive ecosystem 
of accessories that supported the whole [of competitor’s] story […] there is now a problem 
in terms of the sort of experience in [our company] […] Obviously they think that, […] 
hey, that’s so much more that I can do with [competitor’s primary product] cause there’re 
all of these accessories available”. (Stage 2, sales director) [MC4] 
Emergence of a disruptive product category in the market 
 SecPrd1&2&3 
“With [SecPrd2] [the problem] was: in order for us to make the product, you need to make 
changes in the [primary product]. And the cost will increase. And this other thing will 
increase. But it is important because it is a new innovation for the [primary product]. So 
the [primary product] will remain central. And you can promote it as an innovation for 
the [primary product]. When I went [for SecPrd3], I said: It is not an innovation for the 
[primary product]. The [primary product] will die because of these new products that 
appear.” (Stage 3, business owner) [MC5] 
LEGITIMACY MECHANISMS 
Lobbying 
[LB1-5] 
Product advertising based on technical demos and product presentations 
 SecPrd2 
 “when I had the demos I was able to convince them the usability it actually great” (Stage 
2, product manager) [LB1] 
“we had the [SecPrd2 show how it could perform multiple functions at the same time]. So 
these were super strong demos so that it was quite easy to get people on board” (Stage 2, 
product manager) [LB2] 
 SecPrd3 
“and trying to get this management, trying to get their support was actually essential but 
trying to get it in a way that: I’m helping you and what I’m doing will provide benefit you 
too. It’s not a threat. [I’ve done it] by presenting it as a complementary product to their 
main product”. (Stage 3, business owner) [LB3] 
Regular communication with key teams / stakeholders 
 SecPrd2 
“then the communication, I had these regular focus [meetings] with the stakeholders 
around the company where I kind of then shared the latest what’s happening and they had 
a chance to kind of make questions, and if I didn’t know the answers I kind of find it out 
or then kind of said that ‘hey, this question you should contact this guy, he is able to help 
you’. So kind of selling and then keep people, stakeholders, up to date [with] what’s 
happening so that the excitement level kind of doesn’t decrease if you are able to kind of 
a put it high so you just maintain it high as possible. […] and kind of a made sure that 
these guys won’t forget us.” (Stage 2, product manager) [LB4] 
 SecPrd3 
“the head of Primary Unit] was the first one that was on board. You know, so she got 
before even I got there with the presentation on board. Of course she got some 
information, so [the head of Secondary Unit] was preparing her with what this is, this is 
why we want to do it, he was feeding her data constantly” (Stage 3, business owner) [LB5] 
Relational 
building 
[RB1-4] 
Involving legitimate external partners to leverage their legitimacy 
 SecPrd2 
“for certain categories of products [our company] is not a brand that people think of, and 
we didn’t have the money to invest in building that brand in that category […] and going 
with a brand [customers] already knew seem to be the way to go […] [to] get their brands 
to leverage credibility of products in our channel.” (Stage 2, partnering director) [RB1] 
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Internal informal networking to gather support and create critical mass 
 SecPrd2 
“the key challenges was kind of finding the interfaces, making sure they pick up the phone, 
answer the email, staying on high enough on their priority list, avoid being the sort of 
behind the cut line that: Yeah, do we need [SecPrd2]? Hmm, it’s probably better to make 
[the primary product] half a mil thinner so let’s drop it back!”. And these kinds of 
discussions [were critical], like understand that “hey, this is going to kill your product 
this decision”, and being able to influence or turn that decision before it actually destroys 
the whole experience.” (Stage 2, business owner 1) [RB2] 
“I have never seen such ... intensity of the collaboration. So at the end it was just on bunch 
of engineering team working together and it was so enjoyable to see that [the secondary 
unit] R&D, and the [primary unit] R&D and the [SecPrd2] teams, and you name it, all 
kinds of [parent] R&D activities came together.”  (Stage 2, program manager) [RB4] 
 SecPrd3 
“I got a couple of those people to actually think together with me and get them interested 
and motivated. And I think the best thing that came it was like, it was almost like a mouthful 
of fresh air for them. I got people saying the same, that: “yes, this is the thing. We actually 
kind of see it the same.”” (Stage 3, business owner) [RB3] 
Seeking 
feedback 
[SF1-4] 
Ad-hoc internal testing with organisational members 
 SecPrd2 
“so these really hard hard core engineers in [the company] that were working a while 
here and in a way a bit sceptic about new things, but getting the feedback there that 
‘despite what I imagined, it’s really easy to work, so I will use it and it works so there is 
something behind’ …[S-SF1]” (Stage 2, program manager) [SF1] 
“[marketing] struggled still because they didn’t tried [SecPrd2] […] and one [primary 
unit] marketing person came to my desk and said: ‘Ah, this is it. I don’t like this. This is 
difficult to market’. And I have asked her: ‘Have you tried it yourself?’ ‘No, but I know, 
this is like [another complementary product] we used to have several years ago, so I don’t 
like it. It adds cost and I really don’t like it’. But after […] she tried it herself, she said 
that: ‘yeah, I was wrong, this is really great thing.’” (Stage 2, technology manager) [SF2] 
External feedback on product / concept from the market during development 
 SecPrd2 
 “so when these guys [from the Primary unit teams] started to do their [customer studies] 
and our kind of [SecPrd2] were embedded in their one, and suddenly it was evident that 
hey, actually [SecPrd2] is the most valued feature of these [primary products]”. (Stage 2, 
product manager) [SF3] 
 SecPrd3 
“And the feedback that we got from the first meeting with the [customer] was that we have 
the right approach. That what they have seen from the others is actually a technology 
show case. Not a mass market approach.” (Stage 3, business owner) [SF4] 
LEGITIMACY STRATEGIES 
Conform-
ing 
[C-LB1-2; 
C-RB1-2; 
C-SF1-2] 
Demonstrating product fit with existing expectations / interests / norms 
 SecPrd2 
“and what [was of] help was to be clear about why we want it and why we need it. Put an 
extra effort there, and create an aspirational story that kind of hey, this is cool” (Stage 2, 
business owner 1) [C-LB1] 
“every time I did the demos, the impact was pretty much the same: Hey, waw, this is cool, 
Let’s do it. But before seeing the demos, usually the expression was that: What the hell, 
basically, is this one?” (Stage 2, product manager) [C-LB2] 
“there are different reasons for why we selected different companies. But [brand 2] of 
course taking the technology feel a little bit away, giving a little bit more life style element 
to it that gives a nice extra. The [brand 1 because it is] the best [product] brand” (Stage 
2, business owner 2) [C-RB1] 
“The blue pill would be that we kind of integrate fully, and collaborate. And that’s what’s 
we chose. […] we said collaboration is the thing we wanna do, so we want to collaborate. 
The way to achieve marketing visibility is to make great products and to collaborate with 
marketing and the way to sell it is to collaborate with the Sales force, understand how they 
will sell our products, and the way to make great products is to collaborate with the [other 
business unit]  product teams to add more value to the to the total product offer. So that 
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was, I think kind of a mental shift that was, that was an important one” (Stage 2, business 
owner 1) [C-RB2]  
 “we started to do consumers studies and the result from those was excellent. […] So 
continuously we got these extremely positive signals that this is actually something, 
something great, and that users actually value. […] [so] I had these great results from the 
user studies, so I was able to saw that the technology works, and then that this is something 
that actually consumers want and it is it going to swim. It makes things easier if you have 
those kinds of assets available when you are doing the internal selling work.” (Stage 2, 
product manager) [C-SF1] 
 SecPrd3 
“the problem [was] why are we doing it? what is the value that it brings to the bigger 
unit? Why would anybody be interested in that? And it was because the market was 
confirming what I have said from the beginning and they [executive board] heard it, but 
they didn’t believe in it. But it did help that I was saying the same things for the last 6 
months that this product will become essential to the main product. We will not be able to 
sell any more the main product without this kind of complementary product. And that it 
will change the market and it will change the main product, the way it is viewed in the 
end. So when the market started to confirm that, than we got in a rush basically” (Stage 
3, business owner) [C-SF2] 
Selecting 
[S-RB1-2; 
S-SF1] 
Identify and selectively target receptive audiences 
 SecPrd2 
“I think we almost killed it several times. And I think one of the factors has been that at 
the moment that it was almost killed there have been already enough people in different 
parts of the organisation starting to believing in it, there were people in Sales that started 
to believe in it, there were the development team […] the [main technology office] was in 
from the beginning […] but most importantly actually, it got the buy in then from the 
marketing and the strategy”. (Stage 2, innovation senior manager) [S-RB1] 
“[SF1]…So that was ‘hey, now now we are having something that we are getting the  hard 
core engineers to get in to this new technology as well there’, so, they were of course, the 
big exam.” (Stage 2, program manager) [S-SF1] 
 SecPrd3 
“I don’t think I’ve done lobbying. I think what I have done is getting people like, 
throughout the organisation, really, like Marketing, Sales, Forward Lab, Engineering, 
different people, you know people that didn’t necessarily had anything to do with that, but 
I started to have to do with it. And then it started to be a mass at some point.” (Stage 3, 
business owner ) [S-RB2] 
Manipu-
lation [M-
LB1-3] 
Change audiences perceptions, expectations and/or assessment of the innovation  
 SecPrd2 
“maybe the most important thing [of] all this kind of ‘creating the assets’ [activity] was 
to sell the idea inside the company. So there were several stakeholders inside the company 
that we needed to convince that actually this is something  that we must do, and this is 
something that we are able to ... kind of a bring something new to the markets. […] So 
[our technology officer] was able to make these excellent demos of the [SecPrd2]. And 
basically what  I did, I get the samples and I went basically all around the company, kind 
of showing it, doing the demos: ‘hey: this is what we do, isn’t it great? This is 
superior’.”(Stage 2, product manager) [M-LB1] 
 SecPrd3 
“[I didn’t use prototypes] because the prototypes that were from the research centre if I 
would have taken those to the Sales the concept would have died. They were so ugly. And 
they were proof of technology and what I wanted to sell, what I was selling was an idea, 
a dream, something that can be really beautiful. I didn’t have that. I have very ugly things 
that were working. [laughs] So rather than selling those, I was selling, how do you say, 
clouds. […] I had power points. I had the UX team. But it is very important Raluca, 
because I actually had the concept. So at conceptual level, with the product manager and 
the UX guys we were able to describe the use cases, we were able to describe the scenarios, 
we able to describe how the people will use it, why. So we had all the why in place. We 
didn’t have the prototype. We had the why.” (Stage 3, business owner) [M-LB2] 
 “the topic was very difficult because you had to convince [the executive management] 
that there is need for this product category, you had to convince that it makes sense the 
product as such, that it fits a consumer need, you had to convince that you will not take 
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too much money from them in order to do it and they are not going to use their people 
from the other units too much, and you had to convince that you are not a threat to them, 
that you are complementing, not threatening, and you are not doing anything against them 
and try to get this management, trying to get their support was actually essential.” (Stage 
3, business owner) [M-LB3] 
LEGITIMACY PATTERNS 
Trade-offs 
[TO1-3] 
Emphasising alignment with strategic interests of the target audience while 
downplaying product features / actions that do not match normative expectations 
and/or prevalent model/approach within the organisation 
 SecPrd2 
“it was clear for everyone, everybody that for example, efficiency of [the secondary 
technology] is not as good as with the normal [existing technology]. And obviously our 
values, environmental, we are strict in those ones, we want to be a green company. So it 
kind of a …  trying to convince that actually ok, it is, it will consume power, more power 
than a normal [complementary product based on existing technology], but then hey, think 
about the easiness, think about those benefits that you get. And then at the same time, 
during the [use], the efficiency is not on par, but then at the same time I figured ok, your 
[secondary product] is kind of … without [being] used quite a lot of time, so what we can 
do is to kind of get the power consumption on a standby mode as low as possible.” (Stage 
2, product manager) [TO1] 
 SecPrd3 
“So with those guys, I’ve never told them: this thing can disrupt your business. I said: your 
business will benefit from this. And that’s true. I’ve never lied because that’s the truth for 
short to midterm. The disruption will come in longer term […] So with those guys we never 
talked about what will happen in 5 years. Will it be a disruption or not? It was important 
to say: For the next year, you’ll have this as a complementary product and to help your 
product. Fine [they said]. Go do it!”. (Stage 3, business owner) [TO2] 
Engage in external partnerships to create product image despite the prevalent in-
house model to product development 
 SecPrd2 
“this [partnering] received an awful lot of resistance from within our organisation, you 
can’t do it, that there is no way, we don’t do things like that, it’s not possible, it’s not legal, 
it’s ... all those kind of things. At every turn was basically, you know, not trying to sabotage 
it but trying to kind of derail it.” (Stage 2, partnering director) [TO3] 
Inter-
dependen-
cies 
[ID1-3] 
Seek external feedback from customer & consumers to support internal lobbying  
 SecPrd2 
“when we started to see the success [results from consumer testing] [we] became more 
confident that we want to talk more about this so that people were really getting the chance 
of kind of see it and experience it so that it is not just another feature on the feature list. 
And then the whole company, when you get the consumer feedback, starts believe in it, 
because you have facts more or less. […]So then it became easier to start testing it even 
more and looking what are the opportunities and believing in it, that all the investments 
that we are planning to make, make sense.” (Stage 2, business owner 2) [ID1] 
 SecPrd3 
“We went to the [retailer] and said that: hey, we are going to … and that was the first 
thing: hey, look what a cool idea we have and we are going to do this. And they were like: 
yeah, everybody else is thinking that. That was the first thing, that actually because there 
were not too many products on the market yet. But you know, the indication from them 
that actually everybody is planning to do something like that it was the first indication to 
our management that: Damn, this is coming, it’s really coming, it is not this mad women 
there saying this”. (Stage 3, business owner) [ID2] 
 Extensive networking at team level to precede lobbying at management level 
 SecPrd3 
“I had to go to all the important stakeholders and pitch the product. [However] the 
moment I went to them, I had been already engaged with people in their organisation at 
different levels. So how I started [was to go] across the organisation and people at the 
engineering level, or at the product management level, colleagues and people that would 
have been at the level of my sub-ordinate” (Stage 3, business owner) [ID3] 
 
